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Abstract—In a device-to-device (D2D) local area network
(LAN), mobile users (MUs) must cooperate to download common
real-time content from a wireless cellular network. However,
sustaining such D2D LANs over cellular networks requires the
introduction of mechanisms that will incentivize the MUs to
cooperate. In this paper, the problem of energy-aware D2D LAN
formation over cellular networks is studied. The problem is
formulated using a game-theoretic framework in which each
MU seeks to minimize its energy consumption while actively
participating in the D2D LAN. To account for the selfish behavior
of the MUs, a punishment and incentive protocol is proposed in
order to ensure cooperation among MUs. Within this protocol, an
estimation algorithm is proposed to simulate the process of D2D
LAN formation and, then, adjust the mechanism parameters to
maintain cooperation. Simulation results show that the proposed
framework can improve energy efficiency up to 36% relative to
the traditional multicast scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
D2D communications over the licensed cellular spectrum
is viewed as an important feature that will enable emerging
5G cellular systems to deliver high-speed data rates [1].
D2D communication enables direct communications between
mobile users (MUs) without going through the base stations
(BSs).
A class of D2D communication is device-to-device local
area network (D2D LAN). In multi-hop D2D LAN, network-
controlled smart devices can realize cluster-based communica-
tion in an ad hoc manner while operating on the cellular band.
Using D2D LAN, data requests can be offloaded efficiently.
In D2D LAN, MUs actively transmit and receive data on two
wireless links: one link to communicate with the BS over the
cellular band, known as the long range (LR), and another link
to communicate with other MUs in the D2D LAN, known as
the short range (SR) link.
Group communication is an application scenario of D2D
LAN in which the BS receives a large number of requests for
similar data. One class of this emerging mobile application is
simultaneous multicasting of common real-time content to a
group of MUs over the cellular band [2].
Conventionally, when MUs request the same content, the
BS can multicast it to all MUs. But in a D2D LAN, the BS
only multicasts the content to a group of MUs, known as “the
seeds” [2], who in turn forward it to the rest of MUs.
This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under
Grant CNS-1513697.
Several studies have proposed cellular offloading via D2D
communication and the main goal of existing literature is
reducing the energy consumption of MUs [2], [3] and [4].
The problem of finding the optimal energy-aware one-hop or
multi-hop cooperation for all unicast/multicast combinations
on LR and SR links is NP-hard as shown in [3]. Regarding
the cooperation model, existing studies assume full coopera-
tion, centralized location-based group formation, or distributed
group formation [4], [5].
In [3], authors attempt to optimize the MUs’ total energy
consumption by selecting optimal seeds. However, they as-
sume that MUs are “altruistic” and therefore such works do
not study the incentives for participation in a D2D LAN.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel
energy-aware protocol, dubbed multi-hop collaborative real-
time content dissemination (MCRCD), for enabling multi-hop
D2D LAN formation among selfish MUs. We formulate the
problem as a graph formation problem while considering the
MUs’ rational and selfish behavior using a game-theoretic
model. We also propose incentive and punishment mecha-
nisms for maintaining cooperation among MUs for content
distribution. Moreover, in order to adjust the parameters of
the mechanisms, we propose an estimation algorithm. We
show that, using MCRCD, forming a sustainable D2D LAN is
possible. Simulation results in significant improvements in the
energy efficiency. In addition to improving energy-efficiency,
we look for an efficient scheduling scheme which selects seeds
in a way that encourages cooperation among MUs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model. The MCRCD protocol is
discussed in Section III. Simulation results are presented in
Section IV and conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the downlink of an LTE network in which
OFDMA is used to share the spectrum between various users,
using LR links. In this system, MUs can also communicate
with one another using SR links. The system bandwidth B is
divided into X resource blocks (RBs); each of which contains
α subcarriers. We consider an infinite number of discrete time
slots {1, 2, . . . , t, . . . }; each of duration T . In this system,
a number of D2D LANs can communicate over the cellular
spectrum. Let Kt be the set of all MUs present at time slot
t. A D2D LAN formed between a subset of MUs will be
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Fig. 1: An illustration of optimal scenario, MCRCD protocol
and multicast scenario of MU 1, MU 2, MU 3 and MU 4.
represented by a directed graph Gti whose vertices are the
MUs and whose edges are the connections between them.
Within each D2D LAN Gti, one specific MU i is selected
to be a seed which receives the data directly from the BS via
an LR link and, then, it multicasts this data over its SR link.
In this model, we assume that every MU is selected to be
the seed for a period ρiT during each time slot. An MU can
join or leave a D2D LAN only at the beginning or the end
of each time slot. Upon reception of the real-time content on
the LR link, the seed multicasts the data, using its SR link, to
its neighboring MUs (indicated by the graph) in a single-hop
manner. Subsequently, these one-hop neighbors multicast the
data to their neighbors located at a two-hop distance from the
seed. This process continues for a maximum of H hops, until
all members of the D2D LAN receive the data.
At any given time, an MU can have one of three roles:
seed, relay or sink. A relay receives data on its SR link and
multicasts it also on its SR link while a sink only receives
on its SR link and does not relay. Non-selfish MUs can form
the optimum D2D LAN Ĝi that minimizes MUs’ total energy
consumption [3]. However, in such a D2D LAN, selfish MUs
are not motivated to relay and as a result, the content must
be multicast to every MU with a rate limited by the worst
channel condition between the MUs and the BS.
An alternative is to provide incentives for selfish MUs to
form a D2D LAN. At each time slot t, every MU i is assigned
a specific time duration ρiT with
∑
ρi = 1, referred to as the
“seed time”, in which MU i will be the seed of the D2D
LAN. As discussed in Subsection III-A2, ρi can be set in a
manner that provides incentive for participation in the D2D
LAN. Following the selection of an MU as the seed, others
will self-organize into a graph without any assistance from the
BS. The seed and the relays then decide whether to cooperate
(relay) or defect (refrain from relaying).
Fig. 1 illustrates the optimal, multicast, and the proposed
scenarios for receiving common real-time content. In Fig. 1,
at time slot t, all MUs are within the range of one another. In
the optimal scenario, where MUs’ total energy consumption
is minimized and they are not selfish, a D2D LAN between
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Fig. 2: Every MU is selected to be the seed during a portion
of the time slot. With every seed, a new graph will form.
MUs 1, 2, 3, and 4 will form. MU 4 is selected as the
optimal seed for the entire duration of T and the optimal
graph Ĝt4 is formed; in which, MU 1, MU 2 and MU 3 are
sinks. However, if MUs are selfish and non-cooperative the
multicast scenario takes place and all MUs receive on their
LR link with the minimum bit rate. In the proposed scenario,
the BS sequentially schedules MUs to be the seed for specific
fractions of T (ρiT ) where
∑
i=1...4 ρiT = T . The resulting
graphs Gti, i = 1 . . . 4, are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Notation: In what follows, D2D LAN parameters have
primes, E′ and X ′, while the same parameters for multi-
casting use regular letters. Moreover, energy, power and rate
parameters are in calligraphic letters for SR links (E , P and
R) and in regular letters for LR links (E, P and R).
1) Bit Rate: The bit rate between an MU k and the BS
is given by [6]: Rk =
∑
z∈Xk Bz log2(1 +
βP zhzk
σ2+
∑
i6=k P
z
i hik
),
where Bz is the bandwidth of each subcarrier which equals
B
αX , and Xk is the set of subcarriers assigned to MU k on
the cellular LR link, and β = 1.5ln(5Pe) is the SNR gap for
M-QAM modulation with Pe being the maximum acceptable
error probability [6]. The P z is the BS transmitter power
over subcarrier z and hzk is the channel gain between MU k
and the BS. If the BS conventionally multicasts common data
to all requesting MUs, the bit rate on the LR link will be
limited to the worst channel condition between the MUs and
the BS. Therefore, we have R = mink∈Kt Rk, where Kt
is the set of all MUs that request a common data at time
slot t and don’t form a D2D LAN. We assume an underlaid
D2D scheme that uses device relaying with operator controlled
link establishment for device-tier communications [1]. The
BS handles resource allocation (channel assignment over the
cellular band and power allocation for the SR links in the
D2D tier). The bit rate between two MUs k (transmitter) and
j (receiver) on the D2D link can be calculated as follows [6]:
Rk,j =
∑
z∈X′ Bz log2 (1 +
Pzkh
z
kj
I+σ2 ), where X
′ is the set of
RBs that the BS assigns to the D2D LAN. I is the interference
that MU k experiences on each sub-carrier z in the D2D LAN
and is equal to
∑
i 6=kP
z
i hij +P
zhj . The first term indicates
the interference from other D2D pairs and the second term
is due to the interference from the BS. The latter is only
present if the BS uses the same sub-channels for both SR D2D
communications and LR cellular communications, which is the
case for underlaid D2D communication [1]. When MU m is
selected as the seed, the multicast bit rate of MU k on the
SR link will be given by Rk = minj∈X,kj∈Gm Rkj . Thus, at
time slot t, Rk depends on the graph Gm and is restricted by
the worst bit rate between MU k and its one-hop neighbors
in Gm. The reception bit rate of MU k is Rk = Rsk , in
which MU sk is the source of MU k in Gm, i.e., the node
that transmits the content to MU k. Note that the graph of a
D2D LAN is a tree, i.e., a graph without simple cycles.
2) Energy Consumption: The energy consumption gener-
ally depends on transmission/reception time and bit rate [7].
For our network, we apply the generic energy consumption
model of [3] in which, the energy consumption is formulated
as P (R)T . P (R) is the energy consumed per second while
transmitting or receiving with bit rate R and T is the time
duration in seconds. We do not consider a power allocation
mechanism and assume all MUs are transmitting at their
maximum power Pt and that the base station transmits with
constant power PTx,L on all of its subcarriers. When MUs do
not form a D2D LAN, during the entire time slot, every MU
should download the content using its LR link. Therefore the
energy consumption of MU k will be:
Ek = PRxT, (1)
where PRx depends on RRx. Since the role of each MU (seed,
relay or sink) is subject to change during each time slot, to
determine the total energy consumption of an MU, we need
to calculate the power consumed when an MU takes on these
roles. In a D2D LAN, the role of each MU depends on which
MU is selected as the seed as well as the graph that is formed.
In the following we assume that MU m is selected as the
seed, therefore graph Gm is formed during ρmT . The energy
consumption of the seed includes the energy to receive data
on the LR link as well as the energy to multicast the data to
its one-hop neighbors. In this case m = k thus,
Ek(Gk) = (PRx +PTx)ρkT, (2)
in which PRx andPTx depend on RRx andRTx, respectively.
The energy consumption of the relay is the sum of the energy
spent to receive the data from the source (the seed or another
MU) using the SR link, and the energy spent to multicast it
to other MUs using the same link. MU m 6= k is selected as
the seed and MU k is a relay in Gm. Therefore,
Ek(Gk) = (PRx +PTx)ρmT, (3)
in which, PRx and PTx depend on Rk. A sink only receives
data on its SR link. If MU m, m 6= k is the seed and MU k
is a sink, it is true that ∀j ∈ Gm, j 6= k, Gm does not have
the edge (k, j). Therefore,
Ek(Gm) =PRxρmT, (4)
in which PRx depends on RRx,k. The role of MU k changes
according to the formed graph. The total energy consumption
of MU k during time slot t is
Ek =
K∑
j=1
Ek(Gj), (5)
where Ek(Gj) is given by (2), (3), or (4) based on its role
following the selection of the seed at time slot t.
III. THE MCRCD PROTOCOL
Maintaining cooperative behavior is a challenge in D2D
LANs due to the fact that MUs often have to consume energy
to assist others in the LAN, especially for seed or relay MUs.
One approach to design such incentives is via the use of non-
cooperative game theory [8]. In our model, we assume that
the selfish MUs in Kt trust the BS as a trusted third party
(TTP) and will abide by its decisions. Thus, the role of the
BS is that of a mediator in the game between MUs which is
suitable when dealing with D2D over cellular. The MCRCD
protocol has four phases: Distributed neighbor discovery,
graph estimation and scheduling mechanism, self-organizing
D2D LAN formation and self-punishment mechanism. These
phases are sequentially repeated during each time slot in order
to track changes in the environment (due to the mobility of
MUs) or prior self-punishment phases.
During the first phase, distributed neighbor discovery, the
MUs autonomously perform a distributed neighbor discovery
protocol and generate Kt. Having found their neighbors, each
MU can estimate the channel conditions with its neighbors
using methods such as those discussed in [9]. Next, MUs will
truthfully feedback this information to the BS. The remaining
phases are as follow.
A. Graph Estimation and Scheduling
The second phase is performed by the BS. Before we start
discussing this phase, we need to introduce the process of
graph formation which, in effect, belongs to Phase III and is
carried out by the MUs and not the BS. This is necessary
because in this phase, the BS essentially tries to estimate the
outcome of Phase III in order to tweak the parameters of the
scheduling mechanism later on. When MUs start to form the
D2D LAN, each wants to connect to a peer with whom it
would have the highest possible bit rate. This is because as
the bit rate R increases, the energy per bit E(R)/R decreases
[7]. Therefore, each MU i maintains a preference vector of
other MUs that it sorts based on the bit rates between itself
and other MUs. In order to receive the content using the least
amount of energy, MU i proposes to connect to its favorite
peer, MU j, who accepts the connection only if the connection
can be maintained in real time with no buffering due to low
bit rate on the receiving side. In order to properly adjust the
mechanism parameters, namely ρi and the seed MU k(t), the
BS must have an estimation of the behavior of MUs who
interact using the aforementioned scheme. Thus, we propose
a heuristic graph estimation algorithm that effectively mimics
the behavior of MUs.
Algorithm 1 Graph Estimation Algorithm
input. Kt, MU k (the seed), p, P
output. The formed graph Gk
Step 1. Initialize A = {MU k}, B = K(t)\{MU K}
Step 2.
while B 6= {} do
Step 2.1 Propose Phase
Following the sequence of p, each MU i in B proposes
to the MUs in A according to the row P i
Step 2.2 Accept or Reject Phase
Each MU j in A will accept MU i if one of these
conditions is satisfied: RS,ki ≥ RL,k or RS,ji ≥ RS,jsj .
end while
1) Graph Estimation Algorithm: Algorithm 1 is a central-
ized algorithm that is used to estimate the outcome of D2D
LAN formation, given that some MU k is chosen as the seed.
In the MCRCD protocol, the BS assumes that, after select-
ing the seed, MUs autonomously form the graph of D2D LAN
based on the transmission bit rates between themselves on the
SR links, as we outlined in the beginning of this subsection.
To track the process of proposals and acceptances, the BS
maintains several sets and vectors: the accepted set A, the
Unconnected set B, the 1×K−1 proposal order vector p and
the K−1×K−1 matrix P that represents MUs’ preferences.
In the beginning, the seed is the only member of A and
all other MUs are in B. Therefore, when their turn arrives
(signaled by p) MUs can “propose” only to the seed. Since
the content is in real time, if the proposing MU’s connection is
weak, the seed would have to compensate for this by buffering
the content. This is not acceptable, since seeds are also mobile
units with limited memory and battery. Consequently, the seed
will only accept a connection from MU i if the condition
Rki ≥ Rk is satisfied. For the rest of the process, A contains
more than one MU, namely, the seed and some relays. Thus,
the remaining MUs in B propose to the current members of A.
In this case, an MU j will only accept the connection to MU i
if a similar condition is satisfied: Rji ≥ Rjsj , where sj is the
source of MU j, i.e., the MU that feeds MU j itself. This
process of proposing and accepting/rejecting continues until
every MU has a path to the seed. Due to sequential nature of
this process, the order of proposals affects the outcome of the
graph formation; thus the need for p. This vector is announced
by the BS at the beginning of each time slot and indicates when
each MU must propose. p can then be permutated for the next
time slot to ensure fairness. We note that p can potentially
be used as yet another incentive/punishment mechanism. In
summary, MU i proposes to its favorite MU based on the ith
row of P (which represents its sorted preference list) and all
such MUs should wait their turn indicated by p.
2) Scheduling Mechanism: Since MUs are selfish and ra-
tional, we can use game theory to model their behavior while
forming the D2D LAN. Using this model and Algorithm 1, we
design a scheduling mechanism for the BS which will provide
incentive for MUs to participate in the D2D LAN and reduce
their total energy consumption.
We formulate the interactions of MUs by a non-cooperative
game denoted by the triplet G = (K(t),A, u), where Kt is
a finite set of K MUs, indexed by k, A = A1 × ...×AK is
the strategy space, and Ak = {C,D} is the strategy set for
each MU k where strategy C corresponds to cooperating and
relaying while strategy D corresponds to defecting and not
relaying. Each vector a = (a1, ..., aK) ∈ A is known as the
strategy profile and u = (u1, ..., uK) where uk : Ak → R is
the payoff function for MU k. The payoff of each MU is
taken to be the negative of its total energy consumption. We
assume that the end of the real-time content is not previously
known for anyone. Payoffs are calculated at each time slot
and depend on the strategy profile played by MUs at that time
slot. Here we consider two strategy profiles, namely, all MUs
cooperate (All-C) and all MUs defect (All-D) and calculate
MUs’ payoffs under these profiles. Here, MU k’s payoff is
denoted by uk(ak, a−k), where ak is the strategy chosen by
MU k and a−k represents strategies of the remaining MUs.
Therefore, the payoff of MU k at time slot t is:
uk(D,D...,D) = −Ek, uk(C, ..., C) = −E′k, (6)
where the Ek and E′k are calculated from (1) and (5). If MU k
defects and other MUs cooperate, MU k will only receive data
and its payoff will be:
uk(D,C..., C) = −
ρkPRx + ∑
m∈K(t)\{k}
ρmPRx
T. (7)
Comparing (6) and (7), we see that each MU prefers to be
in the D2D LAN but always as a sink. To solve this game,
we must find the Nash equilibrium (NE). An NE is defined
as a strategy profile of the game in which no single MU can
increase its payoff by unilateral deviation. For this game, the
NE will be All-D because the payoff of cooperating is lower
than defecting, no matter how other MUs choose their strategy.
However, when this “stage game” is repeated in every time
slot (stage) of the content, since the end of the content is
unknown, there is a possibility that the outcome of this new
“infinitely repeated game” would be different. In Subsection
III-C, we discuss how the All-C profile is enforced as the
NE of the repeated game. The scheduling mechanism reduces
the total energy consumption of MUs and guarantees that
each MU consumes less energy if it joins the D2D LAN (an
incentive). To achieve this, the BS, as the mediator, solves an
optimization problem to find the seed time of each MU. Next,
after defining a needed constraint, we discuss the optimization
problem in detail.
Definition 1. Individual Rationality Constraint (IRC) [8]:
the mechanism χBS for MCRCD protocol is said to be
individually rational if for every MU k in Kt we have
uk(C, ..., C) ≥ uk(D, ...,D) or E′k ≤ Ek.
Constraints on individual rationality lead to an upper bound
on MU k’s seed time ρkT . The goal of the scheduling
mechanism χBS is to minimize the total power consumption of
the MUs and to motivate them to participate in the D2D LAN.
Therefore, the problem of designing the scheduling mechanism
can be represented as an optimization problem subject to the
IRC and a finite set of other linear constraints:
min
ρk:∀k∈K(t)
∑
k∈K(t)
E′k(t) (8)
s.t. ∀k ∈ K(t), ρk ≥ 0,
∑
k∈K(t)
ρk = 1, E
′
k ≤ Ek.
The first and the second constraints make sure that every MU
is selected as the seed at some point during each time slot.
The last constraint ensures that IRC is satisfied for all
MUs. ρkT is the time duration of being seed for MUk. In
this formulation, we have assumed that during each time
slot, channel conditions stay the same and that the network
topology does not change. Moreover, the protocol does not
require a-priori knowledge of mobility of the MUs and makes
decisions based on the current K and the channel states.
B. Self-organizing D2D LAN Formation
The MUs will autonomously engage in D2D LAN forma-
tion. Once the BS has announced the seed MU k, proposal
order p and the seed times ρiT s, MUs carry out the graph
formation autonomously. That is, in the sub-slot where MU k
is the seed, MU p1 proposes to MU k; MU k checks the
condition RS,kp1 ≥ RL,k and if it’s not satisfied, rejects
MU p1 which must then act alone. However, if it is satisfied
MU i is added to A and MU p2 gets a chance to propose.
The following MUs, namely, MU p2, . . . ,MU pK have pro-
gressively more options to propose to and they do so according
to their corresponding preference lists which form the rows
of P .
C. Self-punishment Mechanism
In the next phase, the MUs will adopt a self-punishment
mechanism and punish any non-abiding MU that refrains from
relaying. Using backward induction, we can prove that All-D
is an NE of the repeated game whose stage game is G [8].
In this subsection, we provide a mechanism that not only
ensures that All-C is also an NE but also forces the game
into either All-C or All-D profiles. This mechanism guarantees
cooperative behavior throughout a time slot. Let p(t+1)k be the
probability that MU k assigns to the existence of the next time
slot (t + 1). p(t+1)k represents the uncertainty that MUs have
about the termination of the content in the next time slot, as
well as their uncertainty about other MUs’ continued presence
in the D2D LAN. We assume that at any given time slot t0,
p
(t0+1)
k = p
(t0+2)
k = ... = p
(t0+N)
k , N ∈ N. Consequently,
the interactions of MUs from any time slot onwards can be
modeled by an infinitely repeated game. In other words, we
assume that there are an unknown number of time slots of
content and that in each, the stage game G is being played;
this repeated game may terminate at the end of time slot t with
probability 1 − p(t+1)k . Therefore, if all MUs cooperate until
an unknown end, the total discounted payoff of each MU k is
calculated as:
Uk(C, ..., C) =
∞∑
t=1
utk(C, ..., C) =
∞∑
t=1
(pk)
t−1E′k(t), (9)
where, E′k is calculated according to (5) and pk is the
probability that MU k assigns to the existence of the next
time slot at the beginning of the game. According to the folk
theorem, we can use a grim-trigger punishment to guarantee
that the All-C is the NE of this infinitely repeated game [8].
Definition 2. Grim-trigger punishment (PGT ): At time slot
t+1, MU k will defect unless every MU (including itself) has
cooperated during time slot t.
Ideally, all MUs relay and therefore the game remains in
the All-C equilibrium. If, however, one of MUs does not relay,
there will be no longer any D2D LAN for the remaining time
slots of the content. If the D2D LAN is to be continued
in the time slot t+ 1, p(t+1)k must be equal to or exceed a
threshold value, which we call the critical expectation value
(CEV). Specifically, if this condition holds, for every MU,
choosing to cooperate is a “best response” as discussed next.
Lemma 1. If at time slot t, MU k’s expectation about the
existence of the next time slot is equal to or higher than the
critical expectation value p∗k, the Cooperation strategy is the
best response of MU k during time slot t in the MCRCD
protocol. The CEV is calculated using:
p∗k =
E′k − (PRx −PRx)ρkT −PRxT
Ek − (PRx −PRx)ρkT +PRxT . (10)
Proof: For “cooperation” to be the best response of MUs to
each other in the context of the repeated game described in III-C,
MU k should have a strong-enough belief in the existence of the
next time slot t. If MUs use PGT to enforce All-C we have:
Ek(D,P
GT ) ≥ Ek(C,C), consequently,
PRxρkT +PRx(1− ρk)T +
∞∑
n=1
(pk)
nEk ≥
∞∑
n=0
(pk)
nE′k,
(PRx −PRx)ρkT +PRxT + pk
1− pkEk ≥
1
1− pkE
′
k,
pk ≥ E
′
k − (PRx −PRx)ρkT −PRxT
Ek − (PRx −PRx)ρkT +PRxT .
Note that, at any given time slot t0, p
(t0+1)
k = p
(t0+2)
k = ... =
p
(t0+N)
k , N ∈ N. In other words, MU k assumes that the current
state of the network does not change in the future time slots, and that
in the upcoming time slots, Ek and E′k will have the same values as
they do in the current time slot.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For our simulations, we consider a set of K MUs randomly
deployed in a 400 m × 400 m area with the BS located at
the center of the area. The total number of RBs is 25. The BS
transmission power is 5 W which is equally divided among
RBs. The maximum number of allowed hops is set to H = 4
hops. To mitigate the effect of interference, we assume that the
BS allocates resources in a manner that the maximum power
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Fig. 3: The effect of the number of MUs on average throughput (3a), energy efficiency (3b), and critical expectation value(3c).
of each MU on the SR link equals 125 mW. Meanwhile, the
maximum interference is restricted to 0.01% of the received
power. The energy consumed per unit time can be considered
to be almost constant for various transmission bit rates using
adaptive rate control [3]. Following these studies, we set
these parameters to the following values: PR,L(R) = 1.8 W,
PR,S(R) = 0.925 W and PT,S(R) = 1.425 W. The thermal
noise σ2 is considered to be 10−13 mW. In all simulations,
we repeat the simulation to get confidence interval levels of
approximately 95% with the variance equal to 1.5. Throughout
this section, we compare three schemes: the optimal scenario,
the MCRCD protocol and the multicast scenario illustrated in
Fig. 1.
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the impact of the number of MUs co-
located in the given area on the performance of the MCRCD.
Fig. 3a shows that in the multicast scenario, average per-
MU throughput is decreasing in K; this is because the extra
MUs in Kt can at best maintain the minimum LR bit rate,
while it’s more likely that they would decrease it. The average
per-MU throughput of the optimal scenario does not change
due to the fact that always the optimal seeds are selected.
Under the MCRCD protocol, average per-MU throughput
decreases in K, but it closely follows the optimal scenario.
The reason is that all MUs are being scheduled and the ones
with unfavorable channel states affect the average throughput
less severely. In terms of per-MU energy efficiency, i.e., the
amount of data received per unit energy consumed [bits/Joule],
Fig. 3b shows that MUs obtain higher energy efficiencies under
the cooperative, optimal and MCRCD scenarios compared to
the non-cooperative multicast scenario. This is due to the fact
that the cooperative scheme not only increases throughput but
also decreases power consumption per MU. In the MCRCD
protocol, MUs are taken to be selfish, therefore the energy
efficiency per MU is smaller than the optimal scenario. The
reason for the trend shift in Fig. 3b when K reaches and goes
beyond 10 MUs, is that as K increases, the IRC becomes
harder to satisfy for every MU in the D2D LAN. Consequently,
the optimization problem (8) becomes infeasible, i.e., a single
inclusive D2D LAN will be no longer possible. At this point,
either some MUs can form a new D2D LAN, or the D2D LAN
breaks up and the MUs continue receiving under the multicast
scenario. In this paper, we have assumed the latter. In Fig.
3c, the critical expectation value (CEV) is plotted versus the
number of MUs. By increasing K, the CEV decreases. This
shows how an increase in the number of MUs, relaxes their
concerns about the continuation of the game, i.e., the D2D
LAN and make them more patient. From Fig. 3b, the average
per-MU energy efficiency is increasing, therefore MUs prefer
playing All-C profile more when K increases.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel energy-aware multi-
hop protocol for optimizing the formation of D2D LANs in
emerging cellular networks. In the studied model, we have
focused on the selfish behavior of MUs. In our model, the
BS is a mediator that assists selfish MUs in cooperating and
forming a D2D LAN. We have proposed a game-theoretic ap-
proach to model D2D LAN formation and cooperation in data
relaying. We have introduced a graph estimation algorithm
to simulate the interactions of MUs and estimate the resulting
graph. To provide incentive for participation in the D2D LAN,
we have developed a mechanism that reduces the total energy
consumption of MUs. Finally, to enforce cooperative behavior
(relaying) in all time slots, a self-punishment mechanism was
proposed. Simulation results have shown the various merits of
the proposed approach along with the corresponding gains.
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